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Foreign Corrupt Practices
STUART H. DEMING*
The pace of formal developments to deter corrupt practices in the conduct of interna-
tional business slowed in 1999. But out of the public eye there continued to be significant
movement towards a coalescing of more global efforts to deter corrupt practices.
I. International Developments
Since the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
(OECD Convention) entered into force on February 15, 1999,' a total of twenty signatories
have now deposited their instruments of ratification.2 Of these, at least twelve signatories
have implemented the OECD Convention. Most of the remaining signatories either are in
the process of implementing or are expected shortly to implement the OECD Convention.
As part of the process of implementation, the OECD Convention established a mecha-
nism to ensure compliance with its provisions.' Phase I of the monitoring process began in
1999 with the legal texts of implementing legislation being evaluated to determine whether
they met the standards set by the OECD Convention.4 Phase II will follow and focus on
the performance of countries that implement the OECD Convention.
*A partner with Inman Deming LLP resident in its Washington, D.C. and Michigan offices, Stuart H.
Deming served in various capacities with the Department ofJustice and Securities and Exchange Commission.
He is the Co-Chair of the Section of International Law and Practice's Task Force on International Standards
for Corrupt Practices, and a member of the Board of Editorial Advisors to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Reporter.
1. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,
Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1.
2. These now include Iceland, Japan, Germany, Hungary, the United States, Finland, the United Kingdom,
Canada, Norway, Bulgaria, Korea, Greece, Austria, Mexico, Sweden, Belgium, the Slovak Republic, Australia,
Spain, and the Czech Republic. For the latest developments, further information can be obtained from the
OECD web site. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (visited Apr. 13, 2000) <http://
www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/annex2.htm> [hereinafter OECD].
3. Revised Recommendation of the Council on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions
(Revised Recommendation), May 23, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1016.
4. The first legislation evaluated was that of Germany, Norway, and the United States. The legislation of
Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, Greece, and Korea was examined in July 1999; that of Belgium, Hungary, Iceland,
Japan, and Sweden followed in October 1999; and that of Austria, Australia, and the United Kingdom in
December 1999. The legislation of Mexico, the Slovak Republic, and Switzerland was scheduled to be evaluated
in February 2000. See OECD, supra note 2.
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A. OTHER INTERNATIONAL MEASURES
Though these were less dramatic, there continued to be developments with the ratifi-
cation and implementation of the Organization of American States' Inter-American Con-
vention Against Corruption (Inter-American Convention).5 The Inter-American Conven-
tion entered into force on March 6, 1997. Of the twenty-seven signatories to the
Inter-American Convention, there are now eighteen countries that have ratified the Con-
vention and deposited their instruments of ratification. 6 Except for Macedonia, no other
signatories to the Council of Europe's Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Criminal
Law Convention) have ratified it.' The United States has yet to make a determination as
to whether it will become a signatory to the Criminal Law Convention.'
II. Domestic Developments
Until December, there was little in the way of U.S. enforcement activity that became
public in 1999, nor were any opinions issued through the Department of Justice's opinion
review process during this period. However, a number of developments suggest an expanded
application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)9 by the Department of Justice and
a further expansion of obligations by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
particularly on issuers and auditors, to deter, detect, and report illegal conduct.
A. UNITED STATES V METCALF & EDDY, INC.
In December 1999, Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. entered into a civil settlement with the De-
partment of Justice for violating sections 104(a) and (i) of the FCPA.' ° The government's
complaint asserted that Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. provided travel, lodging, and entertainment
expenses to the Chairman of the Alexandria General Organization for Sanitary Drainage
(AGOSD), a local Egyptian official, to influence the U.S. Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID) in awarding contracts or contract extensions to its predecessor, M&E
International, Inc." While Metcalf & Eddy did not admit to the allegations in the com-
5. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1999, 35 I.L.M. 724.
6. These include Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Sal-
vador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Vene-
zuela. The Bahamas (Commonwealth), Brazil, Canada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname, and the
United States have yet to ratify the Inter-American Convention. The latest developments relative to the im-
plementation of the Inter-American Convention can be found on the web site. See Organization of American
States, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.oas.org/En/prog/
juridico/english/Sigs/b-58.html>.
7. The latest developments as to the status of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption can be found
on the Council of Europe's web site. See Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (last
modified Jan. 1, 1999) <http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/ 73e.htm>.
8. See id. art. 33 at 1. The Criminal Law Convention is open to accession by states that are not members
of the Council of Europe. The U.S. position is still being reviewed as of this writing as part of the inter-agency
process of the U.S. government.
9. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-l-78dd-3, 78ff(1999).
10. Id. at §§ 78dd-2(a) and (i).
11. Consent and Undertaking, United States v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., No. 99CV1 2 566NG (D. Mass., Dec.
14, 1999) [hereinafter Consent].
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plaint, it did agree to the entry of a permanent injunction, the payment of a civil fine of
$400,000, and an additional $50,000 as reimbursement for the cost of the investigation. 2
Based in Massachusetts, M&E International was a non-public company that was merged
into Metcalf & Eddy in 1997. As an environmental engineering firm, Metcalf & Eddy
sought contracts and contract extensions on the AGOSD Phase I and II projects funded by
USAID. Bids by prospective contractors were subject to review by technical review boards
of USAID. AGOSD held a voting position on the technical review boards for the Phase I
and 1I projects. Officials of M&E International were alleged to have known that the Chair-
man was capable of influencing his subordinates on these technical review boards. 3
During the period of time that the contracts for the Phase I and II projects were awarded,
the Chairman traveled twice to the United States with his wife and two children. Despite
already receiving funds for his per diem expenses, M&E International paid for most of the
travel and entertainment expenses incurred by the Chairman and his family on both trips.
M&E International also paid for upgrading their airline tickets to first class. The airline
upgrades, the payment of per diem advances, and the payment of the additional lodging
and entertainment expenses of his family by M&E International, were alleged to have been
used to induce the Chairman to have AGOSD use its influence with USAID officials to
encourage the awarding of contracts or contract extensions to M&E International. 4
Metcalf & Eddy is significant in a number of respects. It signals continued vigilance on
the part of the Department of Justice as well as ongoing efforts to apply the FCPA in an
expansive manner. The contracts in question in Metcalf& Eddy were with a U.S. govern-
mental agency, not a foreign government or a foreign entity. The ultimate decision was
made by a U.S. governmental agency, not a foreign government or foreign official. Also,
there was no suggestion that U.S. government officials were influenced, actually engaged
in any improprieties, or susceptible to being influenced. In essence, all that the foreign
official in the person of the Chairman was asked to do was, in effect, put in a "good word"
with U.S. officials.
By itself, asking a foreign official to put in a good word for someone is not a violation
of the FCPA. But Metcalf& Eddy suggests that when airline upgrades, per diem expenses,
or entertainment expenses are used for the benefit of a foreign official and, in particular,
his or her family, questions can arise as to whether a quid pro quo existed or, at the very
least, whether the upgrades, additional lodging, and entertainment expenses were used to
induce his or her support. In addition, though the amounts involved may not seem signifi-
cant by U.S. standards, the value of the upgrades and entertainment expenses can be sig-
nificant from the standpoint of a government official in a country where the living standards
may be considerably less than those in the United States or Western Europe. 5
A logical extension of Metcalf & Eddy would be situations where anything of value is
offered or paid to a foreign official to put in a good word relative to an undertaking solely
12. Id. I and 12.
13. See Complaint, Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 14 [hereinafter Complaint].
14. Id. 18.
15. See id. $1 18-23. (It should be noted that the travel of the Chairman was an essential part of M&E
International's contract with USAID. His travel was specifically approved by USAID as being reimbursable.
As a result, there is no question as to the Chairman's travel being bona fide in nature. Rather, it was the extras
in the form of his airline upgrades, his per diem advances, and the payment of airline upgrades and entertain-
ment and lodging expenses for his family that were alleged to have been improper).
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within the United States. Retaining or obtaining business does not necessarily have to take
place outside of the United States, nor does an international transaction have to be involved.
In short, any offer or payment of anything of value to a foreign official to obtain an improper
advantage could serve as a basis for a violation of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.
Moreover, no improper motive needs to be involved for there to be a civil violation of the
FCPA. Corrupt intent is only required to prove a criminal violation of the FCPA.16
The other significant aspect of Metcalf & Eddy relates to the compliance and ethics pro-
gram that Metcalf & Eddy agreed to implement as part of the settlement. M&E Interna-
tional did not have an FCPA compliance program in place when the travel and entertain-
ment in question occurred. 7 By insisting upon and setting forth minimum components of
a compliance and ethics program, the Department of Justice provided guidance as to what
constitutes an adequate FCPA compliance program. The components include:
a. a clear corporate ethics policy prohibiting violations of the FCPA, and the establish-
ment of compliance standards and procedures that are reasonably capable of reducing
the prospect of violations;
b. assignment of responsibility for the FCPA compliance program to senior managers;
c. establishment of a committee to review and conduct due diligence on agents retained
in foreign jurisdictions as well as foreign joint venture partners;
d. corporate procedures to ensure that companies do not delegate substantial discre-
tionary authority to individuals with a propensity to engage in illegal activities;
e. corporate procedures, including a recorded due diligence inquiry, to ensure that the
company forms business relationships with reputable agents, consultants, and rep-
resentatives;
f. regular training of officers, employees, agents, and consultants concerning the re-
quirements of the FCPA;
g. implementation of appropriate disciplinary mechanisms for violations or failure to
detect violations;
h. establishment of a system by which officers, employees, agents, and consultants can
report suspected violations without fear of retribution or going ihrough the chain
of command, including immediate managers;
i. inclusion in all contracts with agents, consultants, joint venture partners, and other
representatives warranties that no payments of money or anything of value will be
offered, promised, or paid, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, foreign po-
litical party, party official, or candidate for foreign public or political office to induce
such officials to use their influence with a foreign government or instrumentality to
obtain an improper business advantage for the company;
j. inclusion in all contracts with agents, consultants, and other representatives a war-
ranty that the agent, consultant, or representative shall not retain any subagent or
representative without the prior written consent of a senior official of the company;
and
k. inclusion in all contracts of a provision for termination for breach of any of the
aforementioned undertakings, representations, and agreements."
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff(a) and (c) (1999).
17. See Complaint, Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. 25.
18. See Consent, Metcalf& Eddy, Inc. 4. The Consent and Undertaking also provided for a number of
other obligations in addition to the establishment of an FCPA compliance program.
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B. UNITED STATES V UNCILEAR SERVICES, INC.
Also in December 1999, the accounting and record-keeping provisions of the FCPA came
into play in United States v. UNCILear Services, Inc.19 UNC/Lear Services was a Maryland
corporation that supplied military parts and services to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the
prime contractor on a foreign military sales contract awarded by the U.S. Air Force. A
privately-held Kentucky company served as one of the subcontractors for UNC/Lear Ser-
vices, and a private Saudi consulting company acted as the agent in Saudi Arabia for both
UNC/Lear Services and the Kentucky subcontractor.
In securing the contract with the Air Force, the contract proposal included a "handling
fee" to cover UNC/Lear Services' direct and indirect costs associated with the performance
of the contract, including costs for repackaging the equipment and other miscellaneous
costs for readying the equipment for shipment. During the contract negotiations,
UNC/Lear Services represented to U.S. government officials that it passed a portion of the
handling fee on to a third party. However, UNC/Lear Services later represented that it did
not have any agents working on the contract.
Contrary to these representations, the Kentucky subcontractor sent fictitious invoices to
UNC/Lear Services for "in country engineering services" to secure $140,000 in payments
for its Saudi consultant. In addition, through UNC/Lear Services' purchases, the Kentucky
subcontractor became, in effect, a sole-source supplier.20 The president of the subcontractor
enlisted the aid of UNC/Lear Services' contract manager to create the appearance of a
competition to meet Department of Defense procurement regulations, thereby enabling
the Kentucky subcontractor to inflate the cost of the parts.
UNC/Lear Services pled guilty to a three-count information for engaging in mail fraud,'
submitting a false statement to the U.S. government,2 and violating the record-keeping
provisions of the FCPA.23 It also agreed to pay $843,000 in fines and restitution as part of
the plea, and $132,000 in a civil settlement with the United States.24 The FCPA violation
was premised on the false recording by UNC/Lear Services of payments totaling $140,000
to its Kentucky subcontractor for its Saudi consultant as a fee for engineering services
conducted in Saudi Arabia. In sum, UNCILear Services demonstrates how the record-
keeping provisions of the FCPA can play a critical role in buttressing charges of violations
of statutes other than the FCPA.
C. QUALITATIVE MATERIALITY
In 1999, through the issuance of Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99, the SEC re-
iterated the care that needs to be taken in considering qualitative as well as quantitative
materiality.26 It emphasized that the "[e]valuation of materiality requires a registrant and its
19. Information, United States v. UNC/Lear Servs., Inc., 2-3 (W.D. Ky., Dec. 8, 1999).
20. See id.
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1999).
22. See id. at § 1001.
23. See id. at § 78m(b)(2).
24. See Plea Agreement, UNCILear Services 4 (1999).
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2).
26. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin: No. 99-Materiality, 17 C.F.R. pt. 211 (1999), available at <http:H
www.sec.gov/rules/acctreps/sab99.htm>.
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auditor to consider all the relevant circumstances."27 It also reported that "there are nu-
merous circumstances in which misstatements below 5% could well be material. ' '1s Among
the considerations that the SEC staff believes may render a quantitatively small amount as
being material are where the misstatement affects the registrant's compliance with regula-
tory requirements or where the misstatement involves concealment of an unlawful trans-
action. 9 A violation of either the anti-bribery or accounting and recordkeeping provisions
of the FCPA could, therefore, fall within these categories under SAB No. 99.
Though SAB No. 99 does not represent new law, it does reflect a renewed emphasis by
the SEC on the obligations of issuers and their auditors under what is commonly referred
to as "section 10A." As part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, issuers
were required to institute procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance of detecting
illegal acts that would have a direct and material effect on the determination of financial
statement amounts.30 Unless clearly inconsequential, section 1OA(b)(1) requires the auditor
to inform the appropriate level of management of an illegal act and assure that the regis-
trant's audit committee is "adequately informed" with respect to the illegal act.,,
When an auditor concludes that an illegal act may have a material effect on the financial
statements and that senior management has not taken remedial action, the auditor must
report to the board of directors that the failure to take remedial action is reasonably ex-
pected to warrant departure from a standard report of the auditor or warrant resignation
from the audit engagement.2 The board of directors must inform the SEC by notice not
later than one business day after receipt of such.a report.33 It should be noted in this regard
that in December the SEC's chief accountant disclosed in a letter to the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants' (AICPA) Director of Audit and Attest Standards that a
relatively small number of reports have been submitted to the SEC pursuant to section
27. Id.
28. Id. The Financial Accounting Standards Board has also stated that "magnitude by itself, without regard
to the nature of the item and circumstances in which the judgment has to be made, will not generally be a
sufficient basis for a materiality judgment." Id.
29. Id. at 4. The demonstrated volatility of the price of a registrant's securities in response to certain types
of disclosures may provide guidance as to whether investors regard quantitatively small misstatements as ma-
terial. "When, however, management or the independent auditor expects (based, for example, on a pattern of
market performance) that a known misstatement may result in a significant positive or negative market reaction,
that expected reaction should be taken into account when considering whether a misstatement is material." Id.
Small intentional misstatements relative to managing earnings can be material. Misstatements should be con-
sidered separately and in the aggregate. See id. at 5. Moreover, in assessing whether a misstatement results in
a violation of a registrant's obligation to keep books and records that are accurate "in reasonable detail,"
registrants and their auditors should consider the significance of the misstatement, how the misstatement
arose, the cost of correcting the misstatement, and the clarity of authoritative accounting guidance with re-
spect to the misstatement. Id.
30. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(a)(1) (1999).
31. If an auditor becomes aware of information indicating that an illegal act has or may have occurred, the
auditor must determine whether an illegal act has occurred. It does not matter whether the illegal act is
perceived to have a material effect on the financial statements of the issuer. Id. at § 78j-l(b)(1). If an illegal act
did occur, an auditor must determine and consider the possible effect of the illegal act on the financial statements
of the issuer, including any contingent monetary effects such as fines, penalties, and damages. The American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in adopting Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82
has largely followed this same approach in clarifying an auditor's role in detecting fraud. However, unlike
section 1OA, the obligations under SAS No. 82 also extend to audits of privately-held entities.
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(b)(2).
33. See id. § 78j-l(b)(3).
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10A. 4 For this reason, the SEC is likely to be looking for situations in which to make an
example of a company or its auditors, or both.
These obligations under section 1OA become particularly complex when the obligations
under Rule 13b2-2 under the Exchange Act are taken into account. Rule 13b2-2 prohibits
any officer or director from making materially false or misleading statements or omitting
to state any material facts in the preparation of filings required by the Exchange Act."
Though it applies only to officers and directors, it is broad in terms of its coverage. It
extends to internal auditors as well as to outside auditors. It also extends to making or
causing to be made a materially false or misleading statement.36 Not only are misrepresen-
tations covered, but a failure to clarify a statement can also constitute a violation of Rule
13b2-2.
The combination of management's obligations under Rule 13b2-2 and an auditor's ob-
ligations under section 10A therefore may effectively eviscerate the protections of the at-
torney-client privilege as well as any inclination to withhold unfavorable information. If
auditors are carrying out their responsibilities under section 10A, audits must be designed
to detect illegal conduct. As a result, questions should be asked as to whether management
has knowledge of illegal acts or where illegal conduct is most likely to occur. Even though
management may have become aware of or suspect questionable conduct through its at-
torneys, management controls the privilege and, therefore, is presented with the dilemma
of disclosure, along with the possible consequences, or face a potential criminal charge for
violating Rule 13b2-2 for failure to disclose.
M. Conclusion
As a practical matter, the consequence of the increasing obligations to detect illegal con-
duct, combined with the increasing obligations to disclose illegal conduct, is that question-
able conduct can no longer be ignored or remain concealed. A company and, in particular,
a publicly-held company, therefore, puts itself at great risk by not taking steps to insure
that it has an effective system of internal controls that includes an FCPA compliance pro-
gram. This is particularly so with the anticipated increase in enforcement activity that is
expected to accompany the implementation of the various international initiatives that ad-
dress corrupt practices in the conduct of international business.
34. Letter from Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant, Securities and Exchange Commission, to Thomas Ray,
Director, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, (Dec. 22, 1999), available at American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/auditstd/
secchief.htm>.
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (1999).
36. Id.
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